Representation

In trying to define "art" it's tempting (for me at least) to rely on the notion of representation.  "All art is representational.  If it's not representational, it's not art."  It's clear.  It's concrete.  And it excludes many of the works we intuitively want to exclude.  Like this . . . 

Dan Peterman, 25 Years of Quality Control, 2015

And this . . .

Matt Mullican, Death Pulling the Soul From a Dead Man, 1976

There are two sticking points.  First, there are countless borderline cases—Picasso's Head, for example.

Pablo Picasso, Head, 1928

I could probably live with borderline cases.  More challenging is the fact that representation alone is not enough.  All art may be representational, but not all representational works are art.  (A stick figure drawing, for example, wouldn't count in my book.)  We need additional criteria to exclude works that are representational but aesthetically crude, or depraved, or objectionable on other grounds.  And if we include additional criteria, representation may be superfluous.  

Suppose for example we decide symmetry, originality, meaning, and decency are all components of art:  we could eliminate representation altogether as a criterion.  I think most qualifying works would in fact be representational (it's hard to imagine a meaningful nonrepresentational work), but maybe some wouldn't be.